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The Pareto-optimal Design of Term Life 
Insurance Contracts 
By David F. Babbel and Nicholas S. Economides 
I.  Introduction 
Numerous investigations have been directed toward aspects of rational life 
insurance purch&es  and optimal coverage levels under differing conditions. 
Most of  these studies  have  taken as "given"  the design of  life insurance 
contracts and  have  focused on  optimal  consumer responses  to available 
insurance opportunities.'  However, in works by  Borch (1960, 1983), Arrow 
(1963, 1974) and Raviv (1979), contract design has been considered explicit- 
ly, yet in none of these studies has the focus been on life insurance; rather, 
general property and liability insurance received attention. 
The present study focuses on the design of life insurance contracts. In it 
results are derived from first principles for the case of  life insurance that 
have their analogues in the work of Arrow on general insurance. Aspects of 
the life insurance problem that diverge from other insurance problems lead 
to an optimal policy design that may differ from those appropriate for other 
lines of in~urance.~  The simplicity of the lottery associated with life insur- 
ance allows us to describe consumers' coverage as a function of premium, 
facilitating a direct examination of  alternative rate  structures. This  is  in 
contrast to traditional approaches wherein optimality is described through 
relations  of  final wealth  in different states of  the world.  We show, under 
very general conditions, how life insurance contracts can be designed so as 
to lead to increases in the welfare of insurance consumers, companies, and 
sales persons (i.e., insurance agents). Unlike other studies, which indicate 
that less  than full  coverage is  optimal when  a positive  loading factor  is 
incorporated  into  insurance  rates,  we  show  that  full  coverage  is  quite 
plausible under a positive loading factor, provided that the load is incorpo- 
rated into insurance rates according to the manner herein specified. Anoth- 
er new  result of  this paper is that insurance consumers will desire h~gher 
' See, for  example,  Mayers & Smith (1983). The studies  have  generally  shown  that  term 
insurance  is  the optimal form of  life insurance.  Indeed Richard  (1975) has claimed  that  all 
available forms of life insurance are linear combinations of  one-period term insurance and a 
savings plan  of  some sort; accordingly,  there  is  no  loss of  generality  in  focusing on term 
insurance, as will be done in this paper. 
Subsequent to our first version of this paper (1981), Borch (1983) has reexamined the case of 
general insurance and shown that these contracts, when optimally designed, also share aspects 
of the Pareto optimal design presented here. Readers are referred to our earlier working paper 
for detailed proofs of  the material contained herein. 
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coverage  levels,  even  though  company  profits and  salesperson commis- 
sions are higher. Associated with this higher coverage is an equal or higher 
level of consumer welfare. 
Both  of  these results  stem from a  restructuring  of  life  insurance  rate 
schedules and the imposition of a policy fee in accordance with the proce- 
dures outlined in this paper. Briefly, the magnitude of  the policy fee would 
be set sufficiently high to include the salesperson's entire commission, the 
total expected profits associated with the policy, and a prorated portion of 
fixed  company  expenditures, while  the marginal  cost  of  coverage  would 
correspond to the mortality probabilities. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, a theoretical frame- 
work  is introduced  which will  be used  in examining the behavior of the 
major parties involved in life insurance policies.  Next, consumer behavior 
is studied within this framework, followed by a discussion of firm behavior. 
A  set of  Pareto-optimal points  is  then  derived  which forms the contract 
curve, and it  is  shown that  life insurance contracts without a policy  fee 
accompanied  by  reduced  marginal  insurance costs are Pareto-inferior  to 
those featuring such  provision^.^ Next, the welfare of  the insurance sales- 
person is considered and a sharing scheme is set forth by which all parties 
may  derive increased welfare. The ultimate allocation of  the welfare gain 
among  all  parties  is, of  course,  subject  to bargaining  negotiations  and 
market ~om~etition.~  In the final section, our results will be contrasted with 
those in other published studies on optimal insurance and contract design. 
II.  The model 
The setting  is  a  single-period  two-state  world  in  which  there are three 
agents: a consumer, a firm, and an insurance salesperson. The consumer 
faces uncertainty in that his income varies beyond his control. This uncer- 
tainty arises from the unknown length of the consumer's life. 
In state S1  the consumer survives and earns income H over and above his 
endowed wealth W (Y= W+H). In state S2 the consumer does not survive 
and has only W, his endowed wealth (Y=  W).  It will be  assumed that the 
objective possibilities  of  occurrence of  these states are well  defined and 
known but beyond the control or influence of all parties. Let n  denote the 
probability  of  the event  S=S2; then  1-n  is  the probability  of  the event 
S=SI. The consumer is endowed with a concave expected utility function 
There is  one (theoretical) exception: if the insurer incurs no marketing  or administrative 
costs but only the actuarial cost of  insurance,  then  one of the Pareto-optimal points  would 
have a zero policy fee. 
'There'ls  a  p;nc\lpa\l-agent  in the distribution of  the benefits between  the 
insurance company and the salespersons. A fruitful analysis of this problem  would involve an 
examination of  alternatives to the firm, such as advertising, and the impact of  these on the 
consumers. We will defer the treatment of  this problem to a future paper. 
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U(.) with  U1(-a)=a  and U1(a)=O,  assumed to be state dependent, and 
represented  by function V if  S=SI and by function B if  S=S2. The insur- 
ance firm offers coverage for the insured at an amount I if he dies. In return 
the insured pays premium P to the firm in both states of  the world.'  The 
expected utility of the consumer when he has an insurance contract can be 
written in terms of the decision variables, I and P, as: 
HI.  Consumer behavior 
The consumer's problem is to maximize his expected utility choosing the 
pair (I, P) that maximizes (I), given the contract P=f(l) offered by the firm. 
Making  the usual assumptions about the utility  function,  i.e., that  it  in- 
creases with wealth, but at a diminishing rate,6 i.e., V1>O, V<O, B1>O, and 
BU<O,  it can be shown that the indifference curves U(I,  P)=constant u are 
concave, and the solution pair (I*,  P*)  must satisfy 
First  order  condition  (2)  characterizes  the  optimum  provided  that 
U(I,  P=flZ)) is a quasiconcave function of I and 
U(I* ,  P*)  >  U(0,O) ,  (3) 
as entering into no contract remains an option of the consumer. 
N.  Comparative Statics 
Having delineated the conditions that give rise to optimal coverage, we turn 
our attention to how the optimal level of insurance varies with changes in 
human  wealth,  H, nonhuman  wealth,  W,  and  insurance  rate  structure. 
To avoid unnecessary complications that do not affect the major conclusions of this paper, 
the model employed in this presentation is timeless. A single-period, two-date model could be 
developed by  redefining H and I  as the present certainty-equivalent values of human wealth 
and the death benefit to be received at the end of  the period, conditional upon obtaining the 
associated state of the world. 
The partial derivatives of  U(I,  P)  are as follows: 
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Consider  the  commonly  offered  linear  contract7  p=f(l)  where 
dPldI=f(n= llm. Observe that for all  linear contracts the  maximization 
problem is concave.* Then (2) may be rewritten as 
which implies 
(m- I)nB'(W+I-P) = (I-n)  V1(W+H-P) 
Observe that m>l. Let fTW, HI P, I, m)=(l-n) Vr(W+H-P)+(l-m)irB1 
(W+I-P).  Then fTW,  H, P*, I*,  m)=O  for all  utility  maximizing  points 
(I*, P*). 
The manner  in  which  optimal  insurance  coverage  varies  with  human 
wealth is given by the sign of d~*ldH.~ 
Thus, the optimal amount of  insurance is increasing in the human wealth. 
'  Under  the  earlier stated assumption that  the objective probabilities  of  the  occurrence of 
states S,  and S2 are given from outside and known, well defined and beyond the influence of 
all parties, a linear contract is a reasonable form of a policy to offer. Indeed, when coupled 
with the assumption (made later) of risk-neutral insurers, it is an optimal form (Borch, 1983). 
The questions relating to Pareto-optimality concern its slope and intercept. 
This is true provided  that at I=0 the contract follows the positive P axis. The slope of  the 
contract is 
while the slope of the indifference curve through (0,O) is 
Also we  assume that  the slope of  the contract dPldI is bounded  away from zero so that the 
optimum coverage is not infinite. 
The following partial derivatives are used in the calculations: 
aflam = (l-n) V'(.) 
since -=  = I  >  0. 
am  rnZ 
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Insurance  coverage  will  increase less  than  the  full  amount  of  a  rise  in 
human wealth if  dI*ldH<l, which will be the case if  and only if" 
Therefore,  the  optimal  coverage  increases  with  human  wealth,  but  its 
increase is smaller than the increase in human wealth if (5) is true, which is 
interpreted  as  the  absolute  risk  aversion  at  the  "living"  wealth  (after 
coverage)  being  lower  than  the  absolute risk  aversion  of  the  "bequest" 
wealth (after coverage). 
Optimal insurance coverage will also vary with nonhuman wealth  levels 
in accordance with the sign of dI*ldW. 
=m (1 -n) V1-(m-  I)  nB" 
n(m-  112 ~+(1  -n)  TI"' 
The sign of the above derivative will be negative if  and only if" 
Therefore, the optimal coverage decreases in nonhuman wealth if  (5) holds. 
Finally we examine how optimal insurance varies with changes in the rate 
structure. From the partial derivatives given earlier, we know 
'O  The derivation is as follows: 
" The derivation is as follows: 
l-x  V'  ~(1--n)V">-~-.~B" 
n  B' 
v"  B  =<  B(B"(.)  ++->-*- 
V'  B'  V1(.)  El(.) 
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Fig. 1. Optimal coverage as  a function of the rate structure. 
We use this information to determine that 
dl*  dl* -  dl*  dm -  dl*  1  =-  _-.-_-a  2 dl'  =-m  -<O. 
d(e )  d(&)  dm  d(&)  dm  d(l/m)  dm 
dI ~mtr.  dm 
This indicates that as the slope of the contract in the (I,  P) plane decreases, 
the optimal insurance coverage should increase, as shown below in Fig.  1. 
This finding is  a direct consequence of the concavity of  the indifference 
curves. 
IV.  Firm behavior 
We follow Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) in assuming that the firm's objetive 
is to maximize expected profits. This is a rather strong assumption which 
appears to be  at  variance with  the theory of  the firm, under which  the 
maximization  of  firm values is heralded  to be a  more  suitable objective. 
Only under certain conditions will maximization of expected profits lead to 
maximum firm value. Main (1981) and Goslings (1982) have shown that in 
the case of an insurance company (and more particularly in the case of a life 
insurance company) these conditions are approximately met. Total risk to 
the  firm  deriving  from  underwriting  operations  is  very  low  and  can be 
reduced substantially through operation of the Law of Large Numbers (see, 
for example, Sharpe (1978,  pp. 82-84)).  What little insurance risk remains is 
almost  certainly  "unsystematic"  risk  which  should  be  irrelevant  to  the 
firm's  shareholders in a perfect capital market.'* Accordingly, maximiza- 
l2  See, for example, Rubinstein (1973). This is not to say that life insurance companies do not 
exhibit systematic risk; rather, that the systematic risk is unlikely to derive from underwriting 
operations per se. Indeed, company profits may  be affected by general economic conditions. 
In particular, as wages go up consumers may demand greater overage that could lead to higher 
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tion of expected profits converges toward the maximization of the value of 
the firm. 
Expected profits associated with contract of  a coverage I and premium P 
are 
The marketing agent (salesperson) is paid AP (as is the customary practice), 
C is a fixed administrative cost associated with each policy, and XI is the 
actuarial cost. The iso-profit curves are 
i.e.,  straight  lines  with  slope  d(l-R)  and  varying  intercept.  Expected 
profits are given by a: 
V.  Pareto-optimal contracts 
We  will  find  Pareto-optimal  points13 by  letting  the  firm  maximize  its 
expected profits, M, subject to the condition that the consumer remains on 
the same indifference curve. Later, by  changing parametrically the curve 
we will trace the entire Pareto-optimal frontier. 
Given that the indifference curves for the consumer are concave in  the 
(I,  P) plane and that the iso-profit curves for the firm are straight lines, the 
Pareto-optimal points  will  be specified  by  the  tangency  between  an  iso- 
profit curve and an indifference curve as shown in  Fig.  2 below. Such a 
tangency condition is specified by  the condition: 
where P is defined  by  (7).  Equation (9) specifies a Pareto-optimal  point, 
profits. A more important source of systematic risk for life insurance companies is likely to 
derive from mismatching the "duration"  of the firm's assets with  that of  its  liabilities (see 
Grove (1974)).  However, these considerations are properly  separated  from the underwriting 
problem and do not concern us here. 
It should be noted that the unsystematic risk rema~ning  may be relevant to the consumer, 
who might discount the promised benefit payment for its default risk. We assume here that the 
issued capital and retained earnings are sufficient  to cover any "blips"  in the claims distribu- 
tion  such  that  the  promised  death  benefit  can  be  regarded  with  certainty.  Alternatively, 
reinsurance or a large insurance mutual fund could accomplish essentially the same result. 
l3 Pareto-optimal points are such that no agent can be made better off without hurting another 
agent. We ignore for the moment the third agent (salesperson) to facilitate the discussion. The 
third agent to the problem is discussed in Section VII. 
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Fig.  2. Pareto-optimal points. 
(I,P). Varying the amount of  profit M, say through a,  the entire locus of 
Pareto-optimal points, i.e.,  the Pareto-optimal frontier, can be traced. We 
now  present  some  examples  of  Pareto-optimal  contracts  under  special 
cases. 
Special Case 1: No marketing costs 
Say A=O,  i.e., that there is no marketing cost (insurance agent fee). Then 
the Pareto-optimal contract is 
P = a+C+nl  (10) 
Condition (9) still holds, with P defined by (10). Condition (9) implies that 
B1(W+I- P)=  V1(W+H- P), that is, at the Pareto-optimal point, insurance 
is purchased up to an amount that equalizes the marginal utility of wealth in 
states S1 and S2. 
If  B1=V', i.e.,  if  the bequest utility  function B is  a translation of  the 
"living"  utility function V,  then in this case I*=H. The consumer will buy 
full coverage. Note that the above results do not depend on the amount of 
profits that the company makes, as long as the consumer is not pushed to an 
indifference curve of lower utility than the indifference curve of no cover- 
age. 
Special Case 2: Zero expected firm profits 
Assume that the firm expects zero profits (say because of intense competi- 
tion among firms). Then M=a=O. The Pareto-optimal contract is 
Condition (9) still holds with P defined by  (11). 
Special Case 3: No  fixed costs 
Assume that C=O, i.e., that there are no fixed costs per contract. Then the 
Pareto-optimal contract is 
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Fig. 3. Suboptimality of contracts w~thout  policy fee accompanied by lowered marginal cost of 
insurance coverage. 
Condition (9)  still holds, with P defined by (12). 
VI.  ~ubo~timaiit~  of contracts with no policy fee 
Suppose the contract 
is offered. Such a contract results in a Pareto-inferior position. It is domi- 
nated by a contract of the form 
that results in a Pareto-optimal position. 
To see this, assume that the consumer and firm are at a position (I*,  P*) 
where (7) and (9)  hold. Then by the proof of Pareto optimality it follows that 
(13) gives less to one of these parties. If the consumer is held at the same 
indifference curve U(I,  P)=  U(I*,  P*),  then the firm loses money by  moving 
to the new contract, as shown in Fig. 3 below. 
In Fig. 3, OE gives the actuarially fair cost of insurance nl,  for all levels 
of coverage, I. AA' depicts the iso-profit line of zero expected firm profits,  - 
where C=(l  -A)  OA  and the salesperson's commission rate A is implicit in 
the slope of  the line, which is steeper than OE. The Pareto-optimal  point 
(I*,  P*) is attained where the indifference curve is tangent to CC', wh~ch  is  - 
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alternative contract given  by  (13) is  represented  by  OD.  Note  that  the 
expected  profit  associated  with  this  contract  is  given  by  (1-A)  of  the 
vertical distance between the zero iso-profit line AA'  and the (parallel) iso- 
profit line BB'  passing through the new tangency point of the indifference 
curve with the contract line (13). Clearly the expected profit deriving from  - 
this  alternative contract, (1-A)  AB  is less than  that  expected from the  - 
Pareto-optimal contract, (1-1)  AC  and yet the consumer is no better off. 
This is a direct result of the concavity of the indifference curve for the 
consumer contrasted with the linearity of the iso-profit curves of  the firm. 
In  some sense the  whole  society  loses  by  moving from  contract  (7) to 
contract (13). The risk averse consumer is not  adequately covered, given 
the features  of  the Ssk neutral insurer. A risk  neutral  insurer can make 
profit by offering a contract that would move the consumer from position 
(I,  P) to position (I*,  P*). 
Another finding of  note is that in  addition  to the firm  receiving higher 
profits under a Pareto-optimal contract of form (7) while holding the insur- 
ance consumer's  utility  level constant, the insurance sales  agent, whose 
total commission is AP  under the typically offered contract (of form (13)) 
receives a windfall gain from the Pareto-optimal contract design (of form 
(7)), which provides a commission AP*>AP.  As there is no reason why the 
salesperson should necessarily reap all of this welfare gain, we next exam- 
ine the sharing rules among between the firm and the sales agent.I4 
VII.  Sharing rules 
Up to this point we have assumed that the salesperson is paid a proportion- 
al amount of  the premium. Now  we  investigate different contractual ar- 
rangements between  the agent and  the firm  which  will  allow  for mutual 
benefits without reducing the welfare of consumers. 
Assume  that  from  the  total  premium  the  firm  keeps  G(P,A) and  the 
salesperson receives  the remainder, P-G(P,  A).  Let M=  -nl+  G(P,  1)-C 
denote the profit received by the firm and A= -J+P-G(P,A)  denote the net 
commission  received  by  the  salesperson,  where J is  a  measure  of  the 
salesperson's "effort"  expended to obtain the sale."  Together these sum 
l4  Up to this point we have held the consumer's utility constant while increasing the expected 
profits of the firm (and commissions of  the salesperson). Of course, there  is  no particular 
reason  why  the insurer (and salesperson) should capture all  the  gain  arising  from Pareto- 
optimally designed life insurance contracts. Indeed, at the other extreme, sales commissions 
and profitability  could have  been held constant while the consumer reaped all of  the gain 
deriving from the new contract design. More likely, the ultimate allocation of the gain will be 
determined by bargaining among the agents, with each of the three agents capturing a portion 
of the gain. 
" In a model such as ours, where the insurance consumer is assumed to make decisions on a 
rational basis, tha amount of sales is not modeled as a function of the level of persuasive effort 
put forth by the sales agent; rather, the sales agent's effort consists simply in presenting the 
necessary policy information to the consumer, who then makes the decision. 
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to A+M= -nI+P-J-C.  At a Pareto-optimal point. 
It is sufficient to have dPldl=n. Then, P=al+C+xI  is the form of a Pareto- 
optimal contract offered by the firm. 
In the arrangement where G(P,A)=(l-2) P, this corresponds to 2=O. It 
will give A= -J to the insurance salesperson and is therefore unacceptable. 
A  Pareto-optimal  arrangement  will  give  a  "lump  sum"  "X"  to  the 
salesperson per contract: P=a+C+zI+X.  Now A = -  J+X. Clearly X must 
not be smaller than J. The amount X is an item of  bargaining between the 
sales agent and the firm. The amount should be at least as large as AP  (of the 
P indicated in Fig. 3) for the salesperson to be as well off as he was with the 
Pareto-inferior contract. 
An important observation is that under a Pareto-optimal contract of form 
P=al+C+nI, where firm profitability and sales commissions are embedded 
in the a' component of the "policy  fee"  (of magnitude  al+C), full insur- 
ance coverage will be purchased by an expected utility maximizing consum- 
er, provided that (1) B1=V' (i.e., the bequest utility function B is a transla- 
tion of the "living"  utility function V) and (2) the consumer is not pushed to 
an indifference  cirve of  lower utility  than  the  indifference curve of  zero 
coverage (see special case 1, Section V). 
VIII.  Concluding remarks 
The problem of insurance has attracted considerable attention in the eco- 
nomic  literature over  the past  thirty  years, and  it  is  surprising that  the 
Pareto-optimal  design  of  life  insurance  contracts  has  received  so  little 
attention. Perhaps a reason for this is that life insurance is typically exam- 
ined in state space rather than the (I,  P) space employed here, where policy 
rate structures are observed directly. The same results can be achieved in 
state space analysis, however.  Rather than replicate  all  of  our results  in 
state  space,  we  will  here  only  provide  a  diagrammatic  overview  of  the 
problem.  The initial part  of  the exposition follows closely  that given  by 
Klein (1975). 
In Fig. 4 the endowed wealth position of  the consumer in state space is 
given by point A, where W+H measures consumption claims if  state S2 is 
revealed. The 45" line is termed the certainty line. (If a family holds claims 
somewhere along this line, their consumption status would be unaffected by 
the breadwinner's  mortality  status.) Typically H>O  so that the initial en- 
dowment point A lies beneath the 45" line. 
Indifference  curve  1 is  simply  the locus  of  wealth  level combinations 
across states that yield the same level of expected utility as the endowment 
point A. Diminishing marginal utility is suficient to insure strict convexity 
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Fig. 4.  Insurance in state space. 
of  the indifference  curves. Beginning at point A  is  the line segment AB, 
which represents the family's  opportunity set, assuming that it can pur- 
chase life insurance at a price equal to the reciprocal of the negative of the  - 
slope of  AB  .  Suppose that consumption claims in one state can be traded 
for consumption claims in the other state at a prices (I-n)/n.  The slope of 
GB is -[(l  -n)ln].  Under these conditions, the purchase of insurance would 
amount to the acceptance of an actuarially fair bet, i.e., one whose expect- 
ed return is zero. It is well known that the optimum for an individual with a 
unique utility function (B(.)=V(.))  would then be along the certainty line 
and the pictured consumer would move  to point D and achieve a level of 
expected utility denoted by the higher indifference curve 3. He would give 
up  AE=P  units  of  income in  state S1 for ED=I-P  units  of  income  in 
state S2. 
If  the insurance were  actuarially unfair  in  the  usual  sense (where the 
slope of the contract is altered), then a flatter contract such as AM would be 
offered. Then the consumer's choice would not be on the certainty line, but 
below it, at Q, on indifference curve 2. Such a contract would not be Pareto 
optimal, however. A Pareto optimal contract is represented in this diagram 
by  a horizontal  line segment moving leftward from point  A, for example 
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AF, to  account  for  the  policy  fee  (which  will  be  divided  among  fixed 
administrative  costs,  sales  commissions,  and  profits)  and  a  rising  line 
segment, such as FG, parallel to the actuarially fair contract line AB. In the 
case of a unique  utility  function as shown here, full  insurance would  be 
purchased for any paralIel contract cutting the 45" line at a point between C 
and D. 
In  summary, we  have  shown that  under  present  arrangements, where 
insurance agents are generally paid commissions based upon the size of the 
insurance premium, both the insurer and insured can be made better off  if 
the marginal cost of insurance is reduced so as to include only the actuarial- 
ly fair cost plus the  sales agent commission, while imposing a policy fee of 
appropriate size to cover fixed costs and company profits. The sales agents 
would also benefit under ihis system because consumers are likely to seek 
higher  levels  of  coverage  and  pay  larger  premiums,  thereby  leading  to 
higher sales commissions. 
It  is  possible  to  achieve  still  greater  welfare gains.  This  would  entail 
further restructuring of policy terms so that a larger policy fee is charged 
and the marginal cost of insurance is reduced further to correspond only to 
its  actuarially  fair  cost.  Such a  policy  design  should  generate  a  larger 
welfare gain to be distributed among the three parties, one that allows each 
party to be better off than under the current arrangement or first proposal. 
The policy  fees that such contracts would  entail should not be confused 
with  the token policy fees that  are currently charged by  some insurers. 
Rather, the magnitudes would need to be sufficient to provide for all of the 
sales commission, a prorated portion of fixed company costs, and the total 
expected profit associated with the p01icy.'~ 
We  conclude  by  comparing the optimal life insurance contract design 
with that for other insurance lines. Arrow (1963, 1974) has shown that, for 
risk neutral insurers, a Pareto-optimal insurance contract for a general loss 
distribution  is  a  linear,  full  coverage  contract above  a  deductible  mini- 
mum.''  The full coverage is optimal even when the premium is character- 
ized by proportional loading, and the deductible is paid by the insured only 
in the states where losses occur. There is no policy fee, and the problem of 
sales agents is not considered. Raviv (1979) has investigated the necessary 
and sufficient condition for the Pareto-optimal contract to include a nontriv- 
ial deductible and to involve coinsurance. 
l6  The reader should be reminded that only the case of a single representative consumer was 
analyzed. 
"  Borch (1983) has pointed out that  "Deductibles do not  seem  very  relevant in  a theory of 
risk bearing, which assumes that insurers are risk neutral . . .  If the insurer is risk neutral, i.e., 
if he is interested only in expected profits, there must exist a premium (above the actuarially 
fair  value)  which  will  induce  a risk averse buyer to take  full  insurance cover.  Deductibles 
should be seen as a practical device for avoiding the expenses involved in checking and paying 
compensation for negligible losses". 
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While we  also propose a  linear contract for life  insurance, our design 
features a sizeable policy fee paid independently of whether a loss of  life 
occurs, but no deductible paid in the event of  death. Moreover, we  show 
that full coverage is generally  not  optimal  under a proportional  premium 
loading scheme,''  but may  be optimal under an additive loading scheme. 
Our proposal of an actuarially fair rate structure at the margin also involves 
altering the compensation schedule for insurance sales agents. Further, the 
expected profits for the insurer are no longer a direct function of the size of 
the policy sold. 
These differences in optimal contract design derive from differences in 
the insurer cost function. The problem of moral hazard, while important in 
other lines of insurance, is small in life insurance, as it involves a tremen- 
dous cost to the insured-his  or her life. In other lines of insurance, large 
costs are incurred in moilitoring and assessing the size of losses, as indem- 
nification is usually a prespecified  proportion  of  the future loss (above a 
deductible), a random variable that ranges from zero to partial to full loss. 
In the case of life insurance, estimating the value of human capital lost in 
the event of  death is of  no consequence to the insurer, who has a fixed 
dollar contingency, although it is  of  concern to the insured  and benefici- 
ary.lg These differences have  led  to the dissimilarities in  optimal  policy 
design. 
Earlier  versions  of  this  paper  appeared  as  IBER  Working  Paper  No.  115,  University  of 
California,  Berkeley, and Department  of  Economics  Discussion Paper No.  155,  Columbia 
University. 
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